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THE RETURN OF GEOPOLITICS: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN AN
ERA OF GREAT-POWER RIVALRY1
Ryan C. Berg & Hal Brands
This article is taken from a larger report published
by Ryan C. Berg and Hal Brands titled “The Return of
Geopolitics: Latin America and the Caribbean in an
Era of Great-Power Rivalry”. The full publication can
be found at www.gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/research/
publications.

1

W

ith the advent of the Biden administration,
it has become clear that the idea of focusing
U.S. strategy on “great-power competition” enjoys
widespread bipartisan support. American statecraft is
increasingly directed at the threats posed by powerful
state rivals—especially China—as opposed to SalafiJihadist extremists and other non-state actors.2
Yet geopolitical rivalry is not simply something that
happens “over there,” in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and
the Middle East. It also happens “over here”—within the
Western Hemisphere.
Just as geopolitical competition is more the norm than
the exception for the United States, historically America
has faced recurring threats from major-power rivals
operating in Latin America. This pattern is repeating itself
today, as the countries—China, Russia, and to a lesser
extent, Iran—with which the United States is competing in
overseas regions are, in turn, competing with the United
States in its shared neighborhood. These challenges have
not yet risen to the level of the Cold War-era threat posed
by the Soviet-Cuban alliance or even the Nazi presence
in many Latin American countries prior to World War
II. But they are gradually calling core American strategic
interests in Latin America into question.
For roughly 200 years, the core American interest
in the region has been strategic denial—preventing
powerful rivals from achieving strategic footholds in
Latin America or otherwise significantly impairing
U.S. influence and security in the region. The nature
and severity of the challenges to that objective have
varied over time, as have the urgency and methods of
the American response. As the United States enters
a new period of geopolitical rivalry, it must update its
understanding of strategic denial to fit the facts on the
ground.

The tradition of strategic denial
The essential thrust of U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere has thus been strategic denial vis-à-vis other great
powers. American officials have sought to prevent major
rivals from developing regional footholds from which they
can menace, distract, or otherwise undercut the strategic
interests of the United States. There has also been a per-
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sistent, if not always consistent, ideological component
to strategic denial—a belief that non-democratic political
systems in Latin America and the Caribbean constitute a
conduit through which malign actors can exert their influence. “It is impossible that the allied powers should
extend their political system to any portion” of the Americas, stated James Monroe in his eponymous doctrine,
“without endangering our peace and happiness.”
Yet if the basic objective of strategic denial has endured
over time, the manifestations and targets of that policy
have repeatedly shifted. The Monroe Doctrine warned
against a restoration of formal European colonial
empires in Latin America; the “political system” it
sought to exclude from the hemisphere was monarchy.
Although John Quincy Adams prevailed on Monroe to
issue that statement as a unilateral declaration rather
than “come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British
man-of-war,” it was London—which had its own policy
of strategic denial vis-à-vis its European rivals—whose
navy enforced the edict for most of the 19th century.
The United States, for its part, spent much of this period
trying to prevent, not always successfully, the expansion
of European influence in Latin America rather than
liquidating it where it remained.
This posture changed in response to growing American
power and shifting international threats. In 1898, the
United States defeated—for the first time since the
American Revolution—a European power in a major
military conflict and thereby banished Spain from the
hemisphere. During the 1890s and early 1900s, America
used various forms of coercive diplomacy to reduce
a distracted United Kingdom’s influence around the
Caribbean basin and gain exclusive control over the
routes for an isthmian canal. Meanwhile, concerns
that internal instability and financial insolvency might
invite European interposition elicited the Roosevelt
Corollary, which established a tradition of “protective
imperialism”—of Washington intervening in troubled
Caribbean countries so that hostile actors would not
have a pretext to do so. This theory of strategic denial
paved the way for multiple American interventions—
in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, even
Mexico—in the subsequent decades.
That heavy-handedness provoked blowback, however,
and in the Franklin Delano Roosevelt era, strategic
denial took on yet another form—this time under the
moniker of a “good neighbor policy.” FDR would end
lingering U.S. occupations, hoping that a less invasive
presence focused more on economic ties and deemphasizing a military dimension of strategic denial—
combined with the steady hand of friendly dictators—
would better consolidate the hemisphere against the
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growing fascist threat. At the Havana Conference in
1940, the United States announced, in the guise of
a multilateral declaration, that it would enforce the
Monroe Doctrine against any extra-hemispheric power
that violated the territorial or political sovereignty
of a Western Hemisphere state. The fear persisted,
particularly after the fall of France, that Nazi Germany
would use subversion, economic coercion, or even direct
aggression to turn South American or Central American
countries into platforms to threaten the United States.3
In response, Washington used various methods, from
good intelligence work to blunt diplomatic pressure,
to limit German influence in the region and eventually
bring Latin American and Caribbean governments into
World War II on the side of the Grand Alliance.
During the Cold War, the target of strategic denial
was Moscow; the danger was that local communists
would take power, through peaceful or violent means,
and turn their countries into beachheads for Soviet
military and political influence. As Castro’s revolution
in Cuba showed, a Soviet presence in the Caribbean
would endanger American sea lines of communication
and expose major gaps in the country’s air defenses.
It would be a launching point and logistical, financial,
and training hub for other burning insurgencies in
the region. A United States consumed with fighting
communist regimes and revolutionaries close to
home would, in turn, find it far more difficult to
concentrate its energies on checking Soviet influence
in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia. It might even find
its physical security endangered. It was this prospect
that led Jeane Kirkpatrick to declare, in the 1980s,
that Central America was “the most important region
in the world.”4

U.S. Blind spots and the Latin America
paradox
The post-Cold War era also revived another, and less
salubrious, tradition in U.S. policy—the Latin America
paradox. That paradox resides in the fact that Latin
America is perhaps the most important region for the
United States, in the sense that pervasive insecurity or
danger there could pose a more direct threat to America
than equivalent disorder in any other region. The
Mexican Revolution, for example, elicited not one but
two U.S. military interventions for just this reason. But
Latin America has traditionally received considerably
less foreign policy attention than other regions
because American influence there—while periodically
challenged—has long been so preeminent.
Since the 1990s, this blind spot has been exacerbated
by several other factors. First, although there have been
major security challenges in the region, most have taken
the form of drug-related violence and out-of-control
criminality—domestic challenges often viewed as law
enforcement matters that lack an obvious geopolitical
salience. Compare, for instance, the remarkably scant
attention that ongoing state failure and rampant violence
in Mexico have received over the last fifteen years to the
attention those phenomena would have received had it
been caused by a Communist insurgency with links to
the Kremlin during the Cold War. “Law enforcement
problems” are, by their nature, unsexy in the foreign
policy world.

The United States used the full panoply of tools—
economic development programs, military coups,
covert action, and direct military intervention—to
fight the expansion of Soviet and Cuban influence.
In some cases, it sought to promote democracy and
economic reform as antidotes to revolution; in others,
it partnered with conservative or downright reactionary
Latin American regimes such as the Brazilian military
dictatorship to bludgeon leftist movements. But by the
1980s, Washington was more decisively moving toward
a strategy that employed democratization as a tool of
strategic denial, by establishing legitimate regimes
that would be less vulnerable to challenges by Marxist
insurgents.

Second, the largely democratic nature—or perhaps the
democratic patina—of the region has masked the severity
of underlying challenges. Since the early 1990s, the vast
majority of Latin American and Caribbean governments
have been democracies, in the sense that they have
regular, contested elections. After Mexico’s transition
in 2000, Cuba was the only fully authoritarian regime
in the hemisphere. Yet the existence of democratic
procedures, consolidated in regional diplomatic accords
such as the Inter-American Democratic Charter, has
obscured concerning levels of political backsliding in
countries from Central America to the Southern Cone,
in addition to the emergence of violently repressive
authoritarianism in Venezuela. It has also dulled the
U.S. response to the creeping accumulation of extrahemispheric influence in hemispheric affairs, in many
cases through the exact same countries experiencing a
rapid decline in the quality of democratic governance.

Within another few years, the Cold War had ended, and
the threat of alien ideologies and extra-hemispheric
power faded more fully than ever before. They did not,
however, disappear for good.

Finally, blind spots in Latin America have been
exacerbated by the intensity and number of challenges
the United States has confronted elsewhere. The 9/11
attacks led to a heightened focus on Colombia, because
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the guerrilla insurgency there could be viewed through
a counter-terrorism prism. But in most cases, the war
on terror diverted focus from the region. More recently,
American resources and attention have been consumed
by a remarkably full foreign policy agenda—ongoing
instability in the Middle East and Africa, including
a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, a resurgent
and revisionist Russia, periodic North Korean nuclear
crises, the rise of China as a regional and increasingly
global power, along with the pressing problems posed
by climate change, pandemics, and other transnational
challenges. Even as the situation has deteriorated in
Latin America and the Caribbean, the region has had to
compete with a remarkably crowded and challenging
foreign policy panorama. And amid the resulting
distraction, several state actors are once again vying for
influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Contemporary challenges—China
The primary threat to American interests in Latin
America comes from China, both because Beijing is
the greatest global challenge for American statecraft
and because its presence in the Western Hemisphere
is multifaceted and widespread. As part of a strategy
to increase its own influence and options in the region
while creating potential problems for the United
States close to home, China engages governments and
supports political models in the region that are hostile
to American interests, while also courting traditional
U.S. allies.
The leading edge of China’s involvement in the Western
Hemisphere is economic. For roughly a generation,
Beijing has been leveraging its massive domestic market
and vast financial resources to draw countries in the
region closer and pull them away from Washington. China
is now the region’s second-largest trade partner behind
the United States. While the United States still enjoys a
comfortable lead in this metric, its advantage has been
eroding since the turn of the century. Between 2000 and
2018, the percentage of Latin American exports going to
the United States dropped from 58 to 43 percent while it
increased from 1.1. to 12.4 percent with respect to China.
In fact, discounting Mexico, China already surpassed
the United States as the largest destination country for
the region’s exports.5 Importantly, China has linked
itself closely with the largest economic power in the
Western Hemisphere outside the United States—Brazil.
Beijing has become Brazil’s most important commercial
partner, doubling in size compared to the Brazil-U.S.
commercial relationship.6
China also uses its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to
project its economic power and improve its geopolitical
position. Since its launch in 2013, BRI has become one
VOLUME 2 | JANUARY 2022

of the most ambitious global development programs in
history. According to Chinese officials, its rapid growth
in Latin America represents a “natural extension of the
21st Century Maritime Silk Road.”7 Thus far, 18 countries
in Latin America have signed on to BRI—including some
of the most prosperous countries in the region, such as
Chile.8
While BRI is attractive to recipient nations because
it purports to address real infrastructure needs and
other development shortfalls, the resulting Chinese
economic leverage can become a means of extracting
political concessions. For example, when Sri Lanka fell
into arrears on the loans it had taken from China (loans
other sources had declined due to risk), it was left with
no other option than to turn over the Hambantota Port,
plus thousands of acres of land surrounding it, to the
Chinese for 99 years.9 China may use the same tactic to
obtain strategic footholds in the Western Hemisphere,
perhaps taking advantage of high debt burdens owed by
small island nations in the Caribbean. Regionwide, the
acute debt crisis that could be the legacy of COVID-19
may provide further openings for predatory Chinese
finance throughout the region.
Technology is another weapon of Chinese influence in
Latin America. Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications
company, is one of the market leaders of mobile devices
in the Hemisphere. Huawei is also a top contender
for the upcoming 5G auctions in Brazil, Chile, and
Mexico. Although the company repeatedly claims its
independence from the Chinese state, the company
possesses an intentionally opaque corporate structure,
and Chinese law requires that Chinese entities “support,
assist and cooperate with state intelligence work.”10
Accordingly, the U.S. is attempting to persuade countries
in the Hemisphere to reconsider adopting Chinese
equipment. American officials have already warned
countries that adopting Huawei technology would make
information sharing and collaboration with the United
States difficult if not impossible.11 U.S. lawmakers
have also introduced legislation to restrict intelligence
sharing with countries that use Huawei equipment
in their 5G networks.12 Additionally, Washington has
offered economic incentives to try to tip the scale away
from Chinese companies. For example, the U.S. offered
Brazil, an erstwhile member of the “Clean Network,”
generous terms of finance to purchase 5G equipment
from other (non-American) sources.13
Although Chinese engagement in Latin America is
primarily economic in nature, military collaboration is
a growing aspect of Chinese activity in the region. Arms
sales, military training, and technical military support
allow the Chinese to build key strategic relationships
with the armed forces of countries in the United States’
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shared neighborhood. The Chinese have sold equipment
to military and police forces from countries historically
opposed to the United States—such as Venezuela and
Cuba—as well as close American partners like Colombia
and Chile. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains
a growing presence in the region through training
and visits, which permits it greater familiarity with
countries’ operational frameworks and preparedness, as
well as their strategic doctrine.14 China has also focused
on ongoing training of the region’s military officers at
PRC institutions of military education, which should
familiarize and educate the upper brass in Chinese
military doctrine.15
More ominously, the PLA is rapidly building new
dual-use infrastructure or acquiring access to existing
dual-use infrastructure that can enhance its military
capabilities in the region. For example, China has
several dozen agreements to build or expand deep-water
ports in the region, and it constructed a space station
operated by the PLA in Neuquén Province, Argentina,
without Argentinian oversight. While the Chinese claim
that this installation is for peaceful space exploration,
the base has obvious dual-use potential as a tool for
espionage, and China does not permit the Argentines
to come near the facility.16 Quite ominously, China
has signed another agreement for a similar facility in
Santa Cruz Province; the strategic importance cannot
be overstated, as Santa Cruz lies just above the Strait
of Magellan, a major maritime chokepoint.17 Likewise,
China’s growing partnership with Panama may
eventually result in preferential access to the Panama
Canal, facilitating the movement of goods and people in
and out of the Hemisphere and inflicting a symbolic as
well as strategic blow to the United States. Two-thirds of
all ships transiting to and from the U.S. pass through the
Panama Canal.18
China is doing more than just developing its economic
and military presence in the region. The Chinese are also
applying soft power capabilities to make their burgeoning
influence seem less threatening.19 Vaccine diplomacy is
China’s latest soft power play in the Hemisphere. Even
though the Chinese government’s attempt to cover up
the outbreak of COVID-19 assisted the virus in its spread
worldwide, China is now repairing (and even enhancing)
its reputation by providing personal protective
equipment (PPE) and vaccines against the virus to Latin
American countries. Even Brazil, whose president is
rhetorically quite hostile to China, has been left with no
other option than to acquire China’s Sinovac vaccine,
lest Brazil be without vaccine.20 And although Chinese
officials claim that Beijing “never seeks geopolitical
goals and economic interests” in exchange for vaccines,
this does not seem to be the case.21 Shortly after initial
VOLUME 2 | JANUARY 2022

talks on the possibility of Brazil receiving vaccines from
China, Brazil announced the rules for its 5G auction,
which allowed Huawei to participate—reversing earlier
comments by government officials that seemed to favor
barring the Chinese company and committing Brazil to
the United States’ “Clean Network” initiative.22 China
also slowed its vaccine delivery schedule of vaccines after
a diplomatic spat between the president’s son, Federal
Deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, and Chinese ambassador to
Brazil, Yang Wanming.

Contemporary challenges—Russia
Russia is a secondary threat to American interests in
Latin America, as overall, Russian power is more limited
and less multidimensional than China’s. Nonetheless,
since the early 2000s Russia has publicly expressed
interest in expanding its presence in the region.
Moscow’s 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian
Federation proclaims: “Russia remains committed to the
comprehensive strengthening of relations with the Latin
American and Caribbean States taking into account the
growing role of this region in global affairs.”23
Most evidence suggests that Russia views its presence
in Latin America primarily as a modest rejoinder to
American influence in Russia’s near abroad—a way
of gaining strategic leverage on the United States and
diverting its geopolitical energies. Contrary to China’s
more robust efforts, however, Russia has circumscribed
its activity and sought to expand its influence in the
Western Hemisphere primarily with countries that have
been historically opposed to the United States and with
regimes of an illiberal nature. (Unlike China, it has little to
offer healthier, more politically stable and liberal states.)
Russia has been actively involved with the grouping of
states in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our
America (ALBA)—most notably Venezuela, Cuba, and
Nicaragua.
Perhaps the primary way Russia supports Latin
America’s illiberal regimes is with military assistance,
through arms sales, technical support, and military
training and visits.24 Nicaragua serves as a prominent
example. Russia provides practically all of Nicaragua’s
armaments, many of which became key instruments
of terror in Nicaragua’s 2018 uprising and the Ortega
regime’s brutal suppression of it. (For instance, Dragunov
sniper rifles sold to the Nicaraguan Army ended up
in the hands of well-trained paramilitary groups that
used them to fire indiscriminately at protestors.) In
2014, the Russian military opened a training facility in
Nicaragua, where numerous Russian military personnel
are stationed—purportedly for joint military exercises
and anti-trafficking efforts, but possibly to aid President
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Daniel Ortega’s efforts to suppress political opposition. A
year later, Nicaragua permitted Russian warships access
to Nicaraguan ports and, in 2017, Nicaragua agreed
to allow Russia to build a Global Navigation Satellite
System (GLONASS) station—conveniently stationed
in proximity to the U.S. Embassy in Managua—that is
likely used for intelligence gathering.25 Russia has grown
its influence in Nicaragua as the Ortega regime’s plans
to install a family dynasty have become clear. Most
recently, it has revealed an agreement to share cyber
tools with Nicaragua to bolster regime resilience and
potentially spy on opposition figures.26
Disinformation and propaganda are also powerful
and fine-tuned Russian tools. They allow Russia to
manipulate public opinion and spread anti-western
sentiment throughout the region—especially toward the
United States. Russian state-owned news outlets have
expanded their reach in Latin America with Spanish
television and news networks such as Russia Today en
Español and Sputnik Mundo. According to its website,
Russia Today en Español reaches 18 million people a
week in ten different Latin American countries and has
more than 3 billion total views on its YouTube channel.27
As with Chinese outlets, regional news organizations
often republish many of these stories.
In the economic realm, Russian trade with the Hemisphere
is not substantial. Nevertheless, Russia plays a significant
role in providing governments in the region financial
support and helping them circumvent sanctions. Like
China, Russia provides loans to friendly regimes with few
strings attached and is flexible with repayment, including
payment in-kind (as it does with Venezuelan crude). In
2015, Russia extended a $1.5 billion loan to Cuba (the
largest since the fall of the Soviet Union) with a generous
interest rate to build large power plants on the island.28 A
mere year earlier, Russia excused 90% of Cuba’s Sovietera debt totaling over $30 billion.29
Russian assistance with sanctions evasion is critical
for the survival of certain countries in the Hemisphere,
notably Venezuela. For example, after the U.S. imposed
sanctions on Venezuela’s state-owned oil company,
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Russia’s state-owned
oil company, Rosneft continued to do business with
PDVSA. (The U.S. later designated Rosneft Trading and
TNK Trading, the Swiss-based Russian subsidiaries in
question in these endeavors, for sanctions.) Russia also
appears to have been quietly involved with Venezuela’s
effort to design a national cryptocurrency, called the
Petro, to help the Maduro regime avoid international
sanctions.30 While the Petro has been unsuccessful due
to bureaucratic incompetency and lack of domestic
and international enthusiasm, Russia will continue to
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aid its beleaguered ally in the effort to evade American
economic leverage.31

Principles for a U.S. Response
Geopolitics are back in Latin America, with greatpower rivals seeking to use the Western Hemisphere
as a point of strategic leverage against the United
States. The United States will need a long-term,
strategic response. There appears to be some prospect
that the region will receive greater relative priority
in U.S. policy: The Biden administration implicitly
ranked the Western Hemisphere above the Middle
East in its Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance. Nonetheless, short of a major crisis, there
is little likelihood that the absolute level of resources
the region receives will increase dramatically in the
near-term. With this in mind, we offer a few basic
principles for a strategic response to the deterioration
of American influence in the region, one that is
mindful of resource constraints and the limits of what
Washington can achieve within them.
First, track extra-hemispheric influence more
systematically. The U.S. government will need a
more complete cataloguing of great-power activity and
presence in its shared neighborhood, as one recent bill
before the U.S. Congress requires.32 Just as important
will be establishing qualitative and quantitative metrics
to monitor and evaluate the presence of its geopolitical
rivals in the Western Hemisphere. Lacking such metrics,
policymaking will continue to be conducted on an adhoc basis. Given the multi-dimensional nature of great
power competition illuminated in this report, developing
such measurements is not a straightforward endeavor.
However, proximity and threat level (regarding both
military and economic challenges to the United States)
should be guiding principles in this effort to establish
thresholds for greater action. In particular, the U.S.
would be wise to systematically monitor the transfer
of dual-use infrastructure and technology to the region
and determine at what point such transfers would cross
a critical threshold, presenting a point of significant
strategic leverage against core American interests.33
Second, track vulnerabilities as well as strengths.
The expansion of Chinese and Russian influence in
Latin American and the Caribbean has not always been
a popular phenomenon. Industries and enterprises have
been hurt by economic competition; support for corrupt
and illiberal regimes has tarnished the reputation of
China and Russia with some local populations. Heavyhanded vaccine diplomacy (with substandard quality
vaccines and defective personal protective equipment
to boot) could create further vulnerabilities for China
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in particular (and Russia, to a lesser extent). Studying
which aspects of these countries’ regional presence create
diplomatic or soft-power vulnerabilities is a starting
point for developing a more competitive response.
Third, engage on security issues of greatest
concern to local governments and peoples. The
United States must present itself as the preferred partner
to help countries in the Western Hemisphere address
their security concerns. Washington has had some
success in this regard in the past, with wide-ranging
security assistance programs such as Plan Colombia and
the US-Mexico Merida Initiative. In other cases, however,
American policy initiatives have focused on issues—
such as curbing migration—of comparatively lower
concern to regional partners. To compete effectively,
the United States must also prioritize the preferred
security challenges of its partners—and understand that
those challenges are quickly shifting. The burgeoning
threat represented by China’s highly subsidized illegal,
unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing activities in
sensitive ecological waters off the Pacific Coast of South
America is but one example of the rapidly evolving
nature of the region’s security environment.34
Fourth, counter the authoritarian playbook.
While the presence of great-power rivals has often
exacerbated political instability and furthered democratic
backsliding in Latin America and the Caribbean, the
truth is that preexisting political tensions, endemic
corruption, and a poor record of governance in many
countries throughout the region leaves them vulnerable
to Chinese and Russian influence. In the domestic
context, there is a well-worn playbook that leads to
authoritarianism, which includes electoral reengineering,
suffocation of civil society and the corruption of the
media’s independence, and the weakening of political
opposition and political institutions, capped off by the
politicization of judiciaries and military and police
forces. Sometimes, leaders following the authoritarian
playbook even consolidate their gains by amending or
rewriting their country’s constitution.35 Fortunately,
the tools inherent in the Inter-American Democratic
Charter can help to sound a powerful tocsin against
democratic backsliding and the authoritarian playbook.
Maintaining the largely democratic nature of the region
and focusing on improving the quality of governance
and political institutions can both reduce the openings
for the authoritarian playbook and limit opportunities
for great-power rivals to use backsliding democracies
and nascent autocracies as convenient entry points into
America’s shared neighborhood.
Fifth, don’t make it all about China. There is no
question that American interest in Latin America and the
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Caribbean rises when perceptions of extra-hemispheric
threats become more acute. But just as the United States
sometimes misfired, during the early Cold War, by
focusing excessively on the dangers of communism—as
opposed to aspirations for local political and economic
progress—in the developing regions, it is a mistake to
convey the impression that Washington cares about the
Western Hemisphere only because of the Chinese or
Russian threats. Similarly, while there are times when
public critiques of Chinese policies by U.S. officials are
entirely warranted, another lesson of the Cold War is that
those critiques are often more effective when delivered
by friendly local actors rather than by the United States
itself.
Sixth, emphasize cost-effective means of
competition. When resources are relatively scarce,
the United States will need to find ways of increasing
the bang it receives for each buck. There are a variety
of possibilities. IMET (International Military Education
and Training) initiatives are an inexpensive means
of building relationships with the next generation of
Latin American military leaders—relationships that
the United States is in growing danger of not having in
the future. Visits by high-level American officials that
have not historically received much attention from the
United States, can also play an outsized role in warding
off rivals’ influence. Showing up does matter: Taiwan,
for example, has used this sort of approach to maintain
is diplomatic toehold in the region.
Seventh, leverage non-governmental advantages.
Great-power competition encompasses more than
just state action. This is where the United States can
leverage asymmetric advantages. The United States
has deep cultural, political, and historical ties with its
southern neighbors, exemplified by the large number
of immigrants and diaspora groups in the United
States who hail from the region. These immigrants and
their decedents have a deep sense of patriotism that
rivals (and often surpasses) those of native-born U.S.
citizens.36 Facilitating people-to-people diplomacy—by
relaxing travel restrictions, expanding trade links, or
professional development programs through publicprivate partnerships—can be a cost-efficient way for the
United States to strengthen its hemispheric relationships
and limit the influence of its great-power rivals.
Eighth, understand that you ultimately get
what you pay for. Most analyses of deteriorating
U.S. influence in Latin America and the Caribbean focus
on the resource-poor approach Washington has taken
to the region over the past 30 years, and call for a more
holistic, better-supported strategy. We have no reason
to differ from this basic recommendation.
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Most, although not all, countries in Latin America and
the Caribbean still see the United States as a preferred
partner on many issues of concern and regret that there
are not greater opportunities to engage with Washington
on these issues. Defending American interests in the
region will indeed require a whole-of-government effort
to provide countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
with alternatives to economic, diplomatic, and military
reliance on extra-hemispheric rivals, in areas such as
investment, 5G telecommunications, strengthening
governance, pushing for greater transparency (in
development and other projects), and highlighting
the predatory aspects of China’s advance while not
appearing to block countries from taking advantage of
the trade and investment resources Beijing can offer. In
the coming years, the United States will likely need to
pursue competition on a strictly limited budget. But if
it does not make greater preventive investments in the
region now, it may once again experience the historical
pattern of having to make far greater compensatory
investments once key tipping points have been reached
and emerging strategic challenges have become
impossible to ignore.
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